

**REMARKS**

Applicants thank the Examiner for the very thorough consideration given the present application.

Claims 1-21 are now present in this application. Claims 1, 10 and 16 are independent.

Claims 1, 10, 11, 16 and 17 are amended. No new matter is involved. Support for the Amendments is found throughout Applicant's originally filed disclosure including, for example, Fig. 3 and paragraphs [0033] and [0034].

Reconsideration of this application, as amended, is respectfully requested.

**Priority Under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

Applicants thank the Examiner for acknowledging Applicants' claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119, and receipt of the certified priority document.

**Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103**

Claims 1, 2, 4, 7-12 and 16-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Applicants' Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in view of U.S. Patent 6,362,804 to Park et al. ("Park"). This rejection is respectfully traversed.

A complete discussion of the Examiner's rejection is set forth in the Office Action, and is not being repeated here.

Because the rejection is based on 35 U.S.C. § 103, what is in issue in such a rejection is

“the invention as a whole, “not just a few features of the claimed invention. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, “ [a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” The determination under §103 is whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See In re O’ Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 902, 7 USPQ2d 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In determining obviousness, the invention must be considered as a whole and the claims must be considered in their entirety. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1567, 220 USPQ 97, 101 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent on the Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See, In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the Examiner is expected to make the factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and to provide a reason why one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have been led to modify the prior art or to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention. Such reason must stem from some teaching, suggestion or implication in the prior art as a whole or knowledge generally available to one having ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. F-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); ACS Hospital

Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). These showings by the Examiner are an essential part of complying with the burden of presenting a *prima facie* case of obviousness. Note, In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The mere fact that the prior art may be modified in the manner suggested by the Examiner does not make the modification obvious unless the prior art suggested the desirability of the modification. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1783, 84 (Fed. Cir. 1992). To establish *prima facie* obviousness of a claimed invention, all the claim limitations must be suggested or taught by the prior art. In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 180 USPQ 580 (CCPA 1970). All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art. In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 USPQ 494, 496 (CCPA 1970).

A suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the prior art references is an “essential evidentiary component of an obviousness holding.” C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352, 48 USPQ2d 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This showing must be clear and particular, and broad conclusory statements about the teaching of multiple references, standing alone, are not “evidence.” See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 at 1000, 50 USPQ2d 1614 at 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Moreover, it is well settled that the Office must provide objective evidence of the basis used in a prior art rejection. A factual inquiry whether to modify a reference must be based on objective evidence of record, not merely conclusory statements of the Examiner. See, In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Furthermore, during patent examination, the PTO bears the initial burden of presenting a *prima facie* case of unpatentability. *In re, Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785788 (Fed. Cir. 1984). If the PTO fails to meet this burden, then the Applicant is entitled to the patent. Only when a *prima facie* case is made, the burden shifts to the Applicant to come forward to rebut such a case.

Applicants respectfully submit that this rejection is improper for a number of reasons.

Firstly, neither the AAPA nor the base reference to Park discloses or suggests “first skipping data latch during a first transition period of the video signal,” and with respect to claims 1-9, Park clearly does not disclose or suggest “second skipping data latch during a second transition period of the video signal.”

Secondly, independent claim 1 has been amended to recite a combination of features including first skipping latch of the pixel data for the black display during a first transition period of the video signal by using a clock enable signal disabled at the first transition period of the video signal; and second skipping latch of the pixel data corresponding to a normal mode during a second transition period of the video signal by using the clock enable signal disabled at the second transition period of the video signal. None of the cited references including AAPA and Park, singly or in combination, teaches or suggests at least this feature as “a clock enable signal (CKEN) disabled at the first transition period of the video signal.” Accordingly, Applicant respectfully submits that claims 1, 2, 4, and 7-9 are allowable over the cited references.

Independent claim 10 recites, “skipping latch of subsequent pixel data during a first transition period of the video signal by using a clock enable signal disabled at the first transition

period of the video signal.” None of the cited references including AAPA and Park, singly or in combination, teaches or suggests at least this feature as “a clock enable signal (CKEN) disabled at the first transition period of the video signal.” Accordingly, Applicant respectfully submits that claims 10-12 are allowable over the cited references.

Independent claim 16 recites, “means for skipping latch of subsequent pixel data during a first transition period of the video signal by using a clock enable signal disabled at the first transition period of the video signal.” None of the cited references including AAPA and Park, singly or in combination, teaches or suggests at least this feature as “a clock enable signal (CKEN) disabled at the first transition period of the video signal.” Accordingly, Applicant respectfully submits that claims 16-18 are allowable over the cited references.

Reconsideration and withdrawal of this rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 7-12 and 16-18 are respectfully requested.

*Allowable Subject Matter*

The Examiner has not rejected claims 3, 5, 6, 13-15 and 19-21 over prior art. Applicants have not re-written these claims in independent form, however, because Applicants respectfully submit that the claims from which they depend are allowable, for reasons stated above.

**Conclusion**

All of the stated grounds of rejection have been properly traversed, accommodated, or rendered moot. Applicants therefore respectfully request that the Examiner reconsider all presently outstanding rejections and that they be withdrawn. It is believed that a full and complete response has been made to the outstanding Office Action, and as such, the present application is in condition for allowance.


If the Examiner believes, for any reason, that personal communication will expedite prosecution of this application, the Examiner is invited to telephone Robert J. Webster, Registration No. 46, 472, at (703) 205-8000, in the Washington, D.C. area.

Prompt and favorable consideration of this Amendment is respectfully requested.

If necessary, the Commissioner is hereby authorized in this, concurrent, and future replies, to charge payment or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 02-2448 for any additional fees required under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16 or 1.17; particularly, extension of time fees.

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Respectfully submitted,

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